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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
RoYAL CANNING CoRPORATION, a 
corporation, and CoNTINENTAL 




IxnrsTRL~ CoMMISSION OF UTAH 
and DoRoT:a:Y MARIE HuGHES, 
Defendavnts. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
This is an action to review the findings and decision 
of the Industrial·C'ommiss,ion of the St'ate of Utah from 
an award of compensation to Durothy Marie Hughes 
against the plaintiffs herein. 
The action arose out ·Of an injury sustained by the 
said Dorothy Marie Hughes while employed by the Royal 
Canning Corporation in Ogden, Utah, on the 8th day of 
July, 1940. The applicant "\Vas engaged in sorting cher-
ries for the canning company, which were fed from a 
chute on to a belt which was operated from a steel shaft 
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run by· ele-ctric motors. The evidence shows that at times 
the cherries would stick in the chutes a.nd in order to 
~·ontinue the operation, it was necessary for the applicant 
to loosen the cherries in the chute so that. the same would 
come down ·On to the belt. While reaching· up to the 
chute to loosen the cherries; which had become stuck, the 
applicant's dress came in contact with the steel shaft? 
which operated the helt, and in Home manner adhered 
to the same and commenced to wind her dress around the 
~shaft. The applicant grabbed her dress in an attempt 
to pull the same loose from the shaft and in so doing, 
per lrands were c-aught by said shaft, and as a result 
thereof she tbecame injured, the injury consisting of 
the breaking of .her left arm above the wrist, and 8:· pull-
ing of the right thumb from her hand, injuring the hand 
between the thumb and the wrist. The evidence further 
shows that at the time of the injury, the machinery was 
unguarde.d; that the guards had been rewoved therefrom 
for the. purpose ·Of repairs. 
·A't the time of her employment which occurred on 
July 3, 1940, she was und·er the age of lS years, i.e., of 
the age of 16 years; that the Royal Canning Corporation, 
her emplorer, :had not ·obtained a permit for her to work 
'aS required by the statutes, although it knHw that she 
was . under: ·18 years of ·a,ge. . At the time of the injury 
the :applieant was working s·e-ven days a week, ten:hours 
per day at 30c per hour . 
. S·ever~~. _h.earings vvere held before . the Industrial 
Coinmission o£ Utah with respect to: this matter after 
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'vhich the l~on1mission made its a\vard, a\varding to the 
applicant $8.31 per \Yeek for the period of te-mporary, 
total disability and $16.00 per \Yeek for a period of 112J;2 
weeks for fotal, permanent diability. The .Commission 
further awarded double indemnity :on the amount S'O 
found due, as prescribed by the statute, hy reason of the 
fact that it found thai the applicant was by the plaintiff, 
Royal c·anning Corporation, illegally employed. 
Apparently then, the only questions to be determined 
in this ca.se a·re (1) wa.s the ·award so made by the Indus-
trial ,Commission based upon substantial competent evi-
dence, and (2) ·whether the application of the la.w wi(th 
respect to illegal employment in awarding double com-
pensation was proper and within the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. 
ABGU·M'ENT 
\\Tith respeet to proposition number (1) we desire 
to ·call the court's attention to the ruling of this court 
with respect to findings of the Industrial Commission 
wherein it has been de-cided so often and so many times 
that any finding made by the c.ommission, which is sup-
ported by any .substantial, competent evidence. becomes 
conclusive and will not be reviewed by this ·court. A 
long list of cases have been decided .which supports the 
proposition, a few of which are as follows: 
Murr:ay ·City v. Industrial Commission, 
55 Utah 44; 
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Retewna v. I ndUJStrial Commission, 
5:5 Utah 25-8 ; 
Amalgamated Sugar Comvany v. Industrial 
.Commission, 5'6 Utah 80; 
George A. Lowe v. Industrial Commission, 
56 Utah 519, 
and innumerable other cases. 
The question then arises as to whether or not there 
was substantial, :competent evidence to support the find-
ing and order of the 'Commission in the award. 
The 'Conunission awarded the sum of $8.31 per week 
for the period of the temporary total disability ending 
August 25, 19·40. With this award the plaintiff brings 
no complaint. We are unable to determine, however, 
and the finding and order does not reveal the method 
employed by the Commission in reaching this amount. 
Th~ law provides that this award shall be made on the 
basis of 60% of the weekly wage, which was being paid 
to the employee at the time of the injury. 
·Shortly after the injury and on July 20th, 1'9r40 the 
plaintiff, Royal Canning c·orporation filed its report of 
the injury with the Industrial Commission indicating 
that the applicant was working seven days a week and 
wa.s receiving 30¢ per·hour, and the schedule filed by the 
plaintiffs, Royal Canning Corporation, Exhibit "4", in-
dicates. that on. July 7th and 8th the applicant worked 
ten hours ·each day and the testimony on page 5 of 
the transcript of the ·:first hearing No. 12, shows that the 
applicant was working ten hours per day. This is als-o 
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borne out by the testimony of ~I r. Stringham, the mana-
ger of the canning corporation, on pages 7, 8, and 9, of 
the transcript marked No. 30. 
It appears from this report and tes~imony that the 
basis of employment ""as ten hours per day, seven days 
per week, at 30¢ per hour and such was only modified 
by the fact that there were not sufficient cherries to con-
tinue the full ten hours, but the evidence .certainly shows 
that if there \Vas sufficient fruit on hand, the employment 
would be ten hours a day, .seven days a week and this 
most ·certainly \Yas and must be construed as the basis 
of employment. The amount ·paid for such services 
would then be $21.00 per week; 60% of $21.00 would 
amount to $12.60. We think that the circumstances in 
this case justify such conclusion and in support of the 
same \Ye desire to call the court's attention to the law 
as recited in 71 Corp. Juris at page 79,6, Section 520, as 
follows: 
'' "\Vhere there is no weekly rate of wages, but 
the payment is by the hour while employed, the 
weekly rate may be estimated on the basis of the 
number of hours in the regular working vveek.'' 
In support of this quotation there is cited the case 
of Smolenski v. Eastern Coal Dock Compa;ny, 93 Atl. 
page 85, which holds as follows: 
'I'We think that in an employment and a com-
munity where the regulation work-week was six 
days a.t ten hours each and the workmen was paid 
25¢ an hour, the natural conclusion of law, if they 
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tried to -reduce the hourly rate· to a weekly rate, 
would be that the weekly rate was $15.00. The 
truth is there is no weekly rate, but we are forced 
by the statute to fix one in order to determine 
the compensation to which the workman or his 
depend~nts are entitled. Under this compulsion, 
we can think of no better method.'' 
In the case of R.akie v. Jefferson Coal and Iron Co1r1r 
pany, a Pennsylvania case at 105 Atl. 63:8, the·court holds 
that in cases of this characjter and in calculations of 
weekly earnings, the days in which the mines were closed 
and when deceased's idleness during such period was 
through no fault of his own, were properly deducted. 
In other words, the plaintiffs attempt to make .such ap-
·plication as would justify a full week's earning of $12.90 
in this case cannot be upheld. The method of computa-
tion· apparently being that the weekly wage is based upon 
the. amount received for the actual time employed dur-
ing the week. In other words, if a person works only 
one day in a week, his wages will be ·computed on a week-
ly basis a.s of .seven times of his earnings during that 
day. ·Or if he worked 3¥2 days out of the week, his weekly 
earnings would ·he computed by twi·ce ~the .amount he 
earned during the 3,¥2 days which he worked, and this 
is in accordanoo with our theory that the applicant was 
employed .seven days a week, ten hours a day, at 30¢ 
per hour; or was on a weekly basis of $'21.00. Also the 
case . of Aocord Q.oumiy C~oal Compo;ny o'f Alalb.ama v:. 
Bush, 109. Southern 151, advances the doctrine that the 
employee shall not lose because of enforced jdleness, arid 
·.fb.'en the ·court makes. the following comment: 
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'"In suc.h a case as here presented, much 
must be left to the sound judgment and judi~cial 
discretion of the trial -court, and we cannot here 
hold, as a. matter of law, tha.t the conclusion 
reached 'Yas wrong· in this respect.'' 
This rule is als-o borne out in the case of Jensen v. · 
Atla-ntic Refin.ing Compa;ny, a Pennsylvania case, at 105 
.Atl. 5-±5. 
We therefore submit that we are justified in the con-
clusion that the applicant was employed ·upon the b.a.sis 
of ten hours per day, seven days per week, at 30¢ per 
hour. 
We repeat, therefore, that we are not apprised of 
the method of computation used by the Commission in 
arriving at the $8.31 per week. 
The ~Commission after awarding temporary total 
disability made an award of permanent partial disability, 
fixing that award a.t the rate of $16.00 per week. This 
the plaintiff complains of. 
We agree that if the total amount of earnings at the 
. . 
time of injury is the basis -of determining the amount of 
compensation payable, then the amount should have been 
fixed at 60o/o of $21.00 per week, or $12.60. However, 
as we understand the law with respect to this matter, 
as set out in Section 42-1-71, the Revised ~Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, the Commission may take into consideration 
the likelihood of an increase in weekly earnings in deter-
mining the average ~eekly wage of the .employee for 
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compensation purposes. We quote from the statutes 
which is as follows: 
I, .; 
"If it is established that the injured employee 
was of such age and experience when injured; 
that under natural conditions his wages would be 
expected to increase, that fact may be considered 
in arriving at his average weekly wage.'' 
The meaning of this .Section of course is that the 
Commission may take into consideration the likelihood 
of the increase of wages in determining the average 
weekly wage of the employee. No doubt the Commission 
based its finding upon the evidence found in the tran-
S·cript marked No. 30 as taken from the hearing at Og-
den, Utah, ·On March 18, 1941, and referring to Mr. 
Stringham, the manager's testimony. In the perusal 
of his testimony· as found on pages 9', 15, 16, 17, 18, and 
20 it will at once indicarte t'o 'the ordinary mind that 
the applicant was apt in her work and was taking care 
of it in good order, and that based upon the experience 
had with girls in that kind of employment she could 
have earned as high as J$32.00 per week. ,Qf course this 
would be on the working with apricots as indicated by 
the· testimony which showed that certain ones in the em-
ploy were making as high as $32.00 per week. But the 
records further .show that the girls were switched from 
one to the other in their employment and were not re..: 
quired to and did not w·.ork constantly on any particular 
kind of fruit. The Commission did not find from this 
~vidence D·orothy Hughes wages would increase until 
she was earning $3i2.00 per week hut that it would in-
.. I 
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crease until she "~as earning $26.66 per week which would 
entitle her to the ~axin1um of co1npensation in the sum 
of $16.00 per 'Yeek. 
\Y. e submit that this finding is based upon substantial 
and competent evidence and under the cases heretofore 
referred to, \Yill not be reviewed by this court hut a.re 
conclusive upon the parties. It seems to be futile to refer 
to law cases ''ith respect to this matter, as the same 
must be determined on the question of whether there is 
substantial, competent evidence in the record to show 
that the earnings ·Of the applicant would in the ordinary 
course of business be increased to a point where she 
would be earning sufficient to justify an awa.rd of $16.00 
per week. It is not a question of law, but a question of 
fact. 
We submit therefore, that there is substantial, com-
petent evidence to justify the Commission in making its 
finding. 
However, if it is determined that such finding is not 
justified by substantial, competent evidence, we most 
earnestly submit that there is c-ompetent evidence to the 
effeet that at the time of the injury, the applicant was 
earning an average weekly ·wage of $21.00 upon which 
the perma.nent award should he based in any event. 
The next question we desire to discuss is whether 
or not the finding of the c·ommission to the effect that 
the applicant suffered a. total, permanent disability, to 
the extent of 7!5:<fo of her right hand at the wrist is based 
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upon substantial, competent evidence. The p::Lain'tiffs 
in their brief, argue extensively and cite a number of 
·cases to the effect that the c·ommission erred in such 
finding for the reason that, as they argue, there was no 
injury suffered by the applicant except the loss of her 
right thumb at the proximal joint, and that in as much 
as the statute prescribes a specific award for such injury, 
the ~Cnmmission was without jurisdiction, to go beyond 
such amount in making the award. 
The statute, however, provides, ,Section 42.-1-62 of a 
1H33 ,Statute, as quoted on page 13 of plaintiffs' brief, as 
follows: 
'''For any other disfigur·ement or the loss of 
bodily function not otherwise provided f.or herein, 
such period of compensation as the. commission 
shall deem equitable and in proportion to eom-
pensation in other cases, not exceeding two hun-
dred weeks.'' 
·The statute provides that for the loss of a hand at 
the wrist, there shall ibe paid compensation for a period 
·Of one hundred fifty weeks. 
This above provision, Section ~2-1-62 of the statute, 
certainly is not meaningless, and has application to such 
conditions as may arise through an injury which is not 
covered by the specific statute. 
Let us take for illustration a situation wherein a 
man's hand is· caught, we '11 say in moving machinery, 
and is caught in such a manner that it is destroyed at the 
wrist; that at the time of the injury, his arm was twisted 
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in the shoulder, and injured or destroyed the nerves 
leading to the arm to the extent that the arm became 
helpless and \Yas of no use in the performance of work 
thereafter. The arm is still there and has not been am-
putated at or near the shoulder, but is a useless memher. 
lTnder the reasoning of the plaintiff, the injured em-
ployee 1vould be limited to recovery for loss of the hand 
at the \Yrist only- a.nd could make no 'claim for -compensa-
tion for the injury to the rest of the arm because the arm 
was still there.. Most certainly such would not be the· 
case and just such situation is intended to be eovered 
by the portion of the statute, above quoted, and we sub-
mit is the identical situation which is prevalent in the 
case at bar, and that the same is fully supported by sub-
stantial, competent evi~dence. 
We desire to call the court's a ttenti'on to the evidence 
adduced at the hearing on January 29, 19·40, recorded in 
transcript 25. Dr. N. Fred~rick Hicken, after an ex-
amination of the applicant and on page 4 of the said 
transcript, testirfied with respect to the injury, a.s follows: 
"There is a large amount of scar tissue, 
thickening and induration of the skin of the 
tendons underlying th~ old incision from amputa-
tion that is apparently interfering with the func-
tion of the metacarpal bones. * * * Due to 
the scar tissue involving the metacarpal bones, 
to whi1ch the first digit is attached it apparently 
interferes with the function of those hones, so 
that -one cannot say that the disability is limited 
to the proximal phalangeal inetaearpal joint, but 
ra•ther extends above that joint involving the 
wrist. I therefore place the disaihility at between 
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70 and 75 ro of the right hand at the wris~t as 
was done on our previous examination. ;This does 
not include the cosmetic appearance nor ·does it 
take in to consideration that the right hand has 
been injured rather than the left. If these con-
ditions We1re considered the disability rating 
sho~ld be much higher. Nor is this disability 
rating predicated on any interpretation of the 
rules or regulations of the ·Commission but is en-
tirely ha~ed upon the limitation of functional 
ability.'' 
Then again when upon cross-examination, the doctor 
wa.s .asked if the injury was not limited to the loss of the 
thumb and to his answer ·"no", the question was put: 
'"Q. What else is there~ 
A. There is. sear tissue involving the meta-
raTpal bone which interferes. She has no abduc-
tion of the metacarpal bone on the thumb of her 
hand, that she would have if she had the joint 
because it interferes with the .attachment of the 
tendons which go out to the joints of the first 
digit of •the hand. The loss is more up here.'' 
Another question was asked: 
'' Q. That also limits the function of the 
wrist~ 
A. It does not interfere with the pronation 
of supination or flexion of the wrist, but it inter-
feTes with the function of ~the wrist joint, in that 
you must have free -abduction and the rotary type 
of function of the phalanges on the thumb to get 
a good grasp of the hand. 
Q. You stated that you didn't c.onsider the 
loss of ~the right hand, hec,ause ~this injury is to 
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the rig·bt band. Do you still 'believe it is between 
70 and 75)~ 'l 
.. A.. ·Of the rig-ht hand at the wrist.'' ( Tran-
script number ~5, pages 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.) 
''""ithout quoting further, 'Ye solicit the c.ourt's atten-
tion ·to the entire testimony of Dr. Hicken. 
Dr. E. J. Capener was then c.alled as a witness and 
he also had n1ade an examination of the a.pplic:ant, and 
answered this question: 
'' Q. You reviewed the case and examined the 
applicant and SaW ·the X .... Ta,ys ~ 
A. Yes, I believe my statement is very 
similar to what has already b·een · said. 
Q. Y·ou agree w·~th the conclusions of Dr. 
Hicken that you have jus·t heard made~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would your testimony on cross eX!amina.-
tion be the same as his~ 
A. Practically, I believe.'' 
It is true that Dr. Kirby and Dr. Lindem did not 
testify as to the loss and function of the hand at the 
wrist; ~rather their testimony indicates that there was 
no such di!sability. However, as we understand the rule, 
it is f.or the Commission to determine whose {estimony 
they will accept as to the dis-ability. ·The question so 
fa.r as we ean ·det'ermine is not a question of disputed 
testimony, but whether or not there is substantial, com-
petent testimony to support the finding of the Commis-
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s1on. We most earnestly submit that the testimony of 
Dr. Hicken and D.r. ~Capener, if believed by the Com-
mission was sufficient substantial, compe·tent. testimony, 
upon which to base the finding that the applicant had 
a 76% disability of her hand at the wrist. 
If that he true and there is for the ·entire loss of a 
hand an award of compensation for 150 weeks, by com-
mon computa·tion a 75% loss would en1title the applioont 
to an aw·ard of 1121;2 weeks or 75% of the total award 
for such loss. 
In the case of Vukelich v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 62 Utah 486, as quoted by counsel for plaintiff on 
pa.ge 2·4 ·of his !brief, there was a dispute in that case of 
the testimony of the doctors with respe0t to disability. 
Two doetors 'teHtified that the disability was 33 lj3<fo, 
while one doctor testified the disability was 20<fo. The 
Commission found the disability to be 33 1/3'% and this 
cour:t upheld that finding and we think :properly so. The 
·Court then in the above case on p.age 491, in eonstruing the 
sta'tute which was heretofore referred to, had this to say: 
''In .addi~tion to injurie'S by the loss of parti-
cular physical members, the statute places in the 
sa.me -class 'any other disfigurement, or the loss 
of bodily function not otherwise provided for.' 
These words are not meaningless. We think they 
evinee · a purpose to include such ·other injuries 
a'S are similar to the loss of physical members, in 
the respect that they are fixed :and perm.anent, 
and .their -consequences and degree of disability 
. can be presently ascertained. 
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"Accordingly ".l' conc.Iude that t·he evidence 
\Yas sufficient to support the findings of the Conl-
mission that the plaintiff's injury \Vas a. loss ·Of 
bodily .function, \vi thin the meaning of the statute, 
and that the l--;ommission acted \vithin 'its legal 
. po,ver when it computed and n\varded ,the eom-
pensa tion aceording to the rule in such case pro-
vided.'' 
Again in the case of North Beck Mining Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm·ission of Utah, 58 Utah 486, cited by counsel 
in his brief on page 21, this :court again discusses the 
meaning of :the statute heretofore quoted with reference 
to another disfigurement or loss of bodily function, as 
follows: 
''It seems p1ain .and clear to us that this 
amendment was adopte·d for the express purpose 
of providing fair and adequate compensation in 
cases like the one before us. 'The majority of the 
CoJiimission in making the award based i~t on the 
idea :that where several fingers ·are lost it is the 
loss of a 'bodily function not otherwise provided 
for' in the schedule, and that, therefore, the com-
pensation must he awarded in proportion to the 
loss of use, to be ascertained by evidence, which 
the loss ·hears to the total loss of the hand. c·om-
menting upon the position taken by the Commis-
sion, counsel for plaintiffs say it is difficult to 
s·ee how they .arrive at a 50:fo loss of his han~d 
on this basis, because the only evidence in the 
record shows that the loss should be 'around 30 
or 40 _per cent.' That was the effect of the testi-
mony of a physician at the hearing before \the 
C'Ommis'sion. A majority o.f the Commission dis-
regarded the testimony of the physician, evidently 
believing that they knew as much as he about the 
degree .of efficiency lost by the amputation of the 
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fingers of a hand. Besides, when the physician's 
te.stimony ·was objected to by counsel for Erick-
son, it was stipulated by the partie·s •t'ha t if the 
Commission deemed it a matter for expert testi-
mony the Commission might make such inquiry 
from reputable physicians as it deemed advisable.· 
At the hearing it was the ·contention of Erickson's 
counsel that it was a matter of which the Com-
mission and court's would take judicial notice, and 
that ~any intelligent person conversant with t'he 
needs of a worki~g man in his particular trade 
·could determine .the damage resulting from the 
loss of a finger. as well as .a medical man. Some 
medical men's judgment would be sound, not part-
icularly because of their medical training, but by 
reason ·Of ·their general common sense. The testi-
mony of other medrcal experts would be entirely 
worthless, because of eccentricites of the parti-
cular physician. At .any rate, the physician ·would 
know no more about such matters than any other 
i:qtelligent man, and no more than the members of 
the Commission. The ,c·ommission determined 
that Ericks-on's loss of efficiency of his right hand 
was 50 per cent. Erickson is .a miner, ~nd was. 
working as .a miner at the time of the accident. 
What can he now earn as ~a miner~ Counsel for 
plaintiffs argue that with three fingers amputated 
one can, with the thumb .and little finger . alone, 
do many things; that ·one ean grasp objects such 
as shovels and tools and use them efficiently. That 
a.ll depends upon what is regarded as efficient 
use. We do not .think that a carpenter with three 
fingers of his right hand amputated could possibly 
be 50 per cent efficient .at his trade, even if he 
could grasp tools with the thumb and little finger. 
A miner handling pick and shovel or .a,. drill ham-
mer eight hours per day, usuing only the thumb 
and little finger of his right hand, would, it a p-
pears ~to us, pave the grea'test difficulty in doing 
50 per cent of the work he could do before the loss 
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of the fingers. Doubtless one ean, as suggested 
by counsel, button his o'Yn clothes and tie a neektie 
''Tith only the thumb and little finger. ln fa'ct 
n1any men could easily dispense \ri th the use of 
three fing-ers and tie a four-in-hand \Yith neatness 
and dispatch, hut tying neckties is not of great 
importance in a miner's life and w·ork. The thing 
of importance here is "'"hether the miner could 
still earn a miner's "\Vages as a miner, or at any-
thing else that a miner can do, and that question 
we unhesitatingly answer in .the negative. We 
are impressed, from what is common knowledge 
of which courts take judicial notice, ~that the a p-
pellant 's loss ·Of the usability of his hand in his 
vocation as a miner exceeds the 50 per cent los:s 
of efficiency found 'by the Commission, and that 
if the Commission made any mistake it was nnt 
in finding· the percentlage of loss -of ·Claimant's 
right hand to be in excess ·Of 50 per ~cent. As to 
the percentage of loss of efficiency, we .are, how-
ever, not concerned. That is a question of fact 
wholly within the provinc.e of the Commission for 
decision. If it adopted the proper method of 
estimating compensation, as we :think .it did, the 
question of the amount of the loss of efficiency 
is wholly one of fact that is not reVIiewable here.'' 
We submit therefore that there is subs\tanti1al, com-
petent evidence in the record suffi'Cien1t to base the find-
ing of the Commiission that there was a. 7·5% loss of the 
applicant's hand at the wrist. Again we suggest that 
this is a question of fact to be determined by the Com-
mission from 1the evidence and ·not a. question of law, 
and tha~t there being substantial, competent evidence 
upon which the Commission could base such finding, that 
the s.ame i•s conclusive and will not be ·reviewed by this 
court. 
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We next desire to discuss the proposition of whether 
the application of :the law with respect to illegal employ-
ment in awarding double compens'ation was proper and 
witliin the jurisdi·ction of the ·C·ommission. 
There is no dispute that the applieant was under the 
age required by law when she was employed by the plain-
tiff, Royal Canning Corp.orat1ion, and there likewise is 
no dispute that ·she did nolt have a permit to work as 
required by the statute. 
The only question that plaintiffs' raise with respect 
to this matter is that some pers~on whom they say had 
some ·connection with the Industrial C·ommission reque·st-
ed the employment, and that the plaintiff was attempting 
to cooperate with that person and by reason of such co-
operation, .the pl·aintiff failed to obtain the permit re-
quired hy law. There was s-ome claim by the plaintiffs 
that the duty was upun the applicant to obtain the permit. 
Now with respect to the connection of the person with 
the InduHtrial Commission through which the plaintiff 
attempted to charge the Commissi:on with sending the 
applicant to work; we call. ·the court's atten.tion to the 
' ' 
transcript number 12 on pages 26 and 27, the following 
questions were propounded to Mr. Stringham, by Mr~ 
Jones: 
"·Q~ Which w~ould be sent to you by the In~ 
dustria.I,C:ommission and you :would employ them~ 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Shields: Wait a minute. 
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Conunissioner J udp;ler: Not the Industrial 
Commission, you don't mean that. 
~-\. The employ1nent office under the direc-
tion of the Industri,al Commission. 
~Ir. Shield·s: I object to rtha.t because that 
. is a conclusion. 
By ~Ir. Jones: 
Q. \\"'"ho had direction of that~ Was there 
some lady '\Yho used to c.ome over from Salt L·ake 
to work with you in this pla.c.ement bureau~ 
A. I imagine that was worked with the 
placement bureau. 
Q. What 'vas her name~ 
A. Lottie Shupe. 
Com. J ud g;ler: Mrs. Shupe is director of the 
\\-romen's Division of the Industrial Commisision 
and has nothing to ·do with the employment 
division. 
Mr. J·ones: · You know what her position is~ 
Com. J udgler : She has no connection with 
the unemployment division.'' 
·Counsel in his brief then cited s'ome criminal cases 
which go to the question .of inducement wherein the court 
holds that, where defendant is lured hy an officer into 
.commission of an act, there should not he a eonvicti'on. 
We fail to ~see any connection 'between these cases, and 
the case at bar. 
We -call the ·cour~t's attention to the fact that an 
award! is made to the applicant here under the provisions 
,. 
of the ~statute and just how her rights can be jeopardized 
or set aside by any .act .of the Co:rnmissio·n, aS"suming 
that the Commission was in .any way· responsible for·the 
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failure of the employer to obtain the permit is just a 
little difficult to understand. 
We .feel th1at this matter being statutory, the statute'S 
should be strictly construed and applied. L~et. us see what 
the legislature says with respect to this matter. We call 
the cou:vt's attention to Section 14-·6-3 of Chapter 11 in 
the Laws of Utah, 1933, which reads as follows: 
'"No minor under eighteen years of age shall 
be employed, permitted, or suffered to work in 
any place of employment, dangerous or prejudi-
cial to the life, he~a1th, safety or welfare of such 
minor. * * * N.o minor under eighteen years 
of a.ge shall be employed, permitted or suffered 
to work in oiling, :cleaning, or wiping machinery 
in motion, in applying belts to a pulley in motion 
or assisting therein, or in proximity to any un-
. guarded bel·t or gearing.'' 
We desire to call the court ,.s attention again· to the 
r·eport made by the plaintiff, Royal Canning Corporation 
in reporting this accident. Under question number 21 
·On the report, we find the following, ''Was the machinery 
or part guarded~'' '·'Yes". ''Was gua.rd prope-rly at-
ta,ched at the time of injury~'' No answer. '·'If not, 
who removed it~'' ''A. R.emoved for repair.'' 
Mr. Stringham testified, transrc.ript 12 at page 4.6·, as 
follows: 
'' Q. Mr. Stringham at the place where she 
was injured is where the guard was missing~ 
A Y . ,, . es, s1r. 
Again the testimony of Ruth Douglas, tr~an,s-cript 
number 12., page 40: 
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• ·t~. On the other side \\7 here 8he wen~t the 
guard "~as out "~here the machinery had been 
broken·? 
A. Yes.'' 
It then is not a question of "~hether ·or not the plain-
tiffs actually placed her to 'York on ·the side of the belt, 
"~here the machinery 'Ya.s unguarded, but if she was per-
mitted ·to work by the en1ployer in proximity to an un-
guarded belt or gearing, the employer comes within the 
provisions ·Of the statute, ·above quoted. 
Now "~ith respect to the permit and upon whom rests 
the duty "i.th respect to obtaining the permit, we desire to 
call the court's attention to Secti'on 14-6-5 of Chap. 11 of 
the· Session Laws of Utah, 193.3, which is as follows: · 
''No minor under eighteen ye.ars of age shall 
be employed, permitted, or suffered to work in, 
about, or in connection with any occupation, un-
less his employer has procured before the employ-
ment of said minor an employment cer~tificate 
issued as herein~after prescrihed, except that such 
minors may be employed without such a certi-
ficate outside of school hours, in h·ousework, agri-
cultural work and in casual work usual to the 
home of the employer; provided, that such em-
ployment shall not be in connection with nor form 
a part of the business, trade, profession or oc-
cupation of the employer.'' 
,Section 14..J6-6 -designates who shall issue such per-
mits and Seetion 14-6-8 prescribes the method of oibt'ain-
ing 'such permit. 
We are unable to determine how the language could 
be more s·pecin:c in prescDibing a duty upon an employer 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
to refuse to employ or permit the employment of a minur 
in a business, such as the plaintiffs in this case operates, 
without that permit which the statute positively says 
must be procured. by 'such employer. 
We see in the ,Section ·no exceptions and ll'O place to 
inject excuses. I1t simply -calls upon the employer to pro-
cure the permit and until he does so, not to permit such 
employee to work. The law is very specific. 
We submit, therefore, that the applicant in this case 
was illegally employed for two reasons, (1), that she was 
permitted ·Or suffered to work around unguarded ma-
chinery and ( 2), she was also permitted and suffered to 
work in the business of the plaintiff without the plaintiff 
having procured the permit required by the law, and the 
plwintiff was n'ot mistaken by the situation. ·He was ad-
vised when the .applicant filled out her application, which 
is in the record as applicant "s ' '·Exh:Ubi~t A' '. Under the 
question "age'', is found, 1'6. At that ·time the plaintiff 
was put on notice as to the age of the applicant. · 
With respect to the procedure in eases of illegal ·em-
ployment, we ·call the court's attenti'On to ·Seetion 14-6-27, 
of Chapter 11 of the Session Laws of Utah, 1933, which 
reads as foll.ows : 
''In ~the event of accidental injury to a. minor 
who is found upon inve-s~tigatlion to be illegally 
employed by an employer subject to the provisions 
of the compen'sation law, s.aid minor shall not be 
debarred from receiving -compensation, but shall 
. be ep.titled to double ~the compensation to which 
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vided. that the insurance earrier shall be li,able 
for all reas{)nable medical .and hospital expenses 
..,_ incurred in healing the injury, plus one-half o'f 
the compens-a.tion to be paid, an·d the employer 
shall be li•able for the additional one-half of said 
compensation a·s a penalty for the illegal employ-
ment -of said minor." 
This Section of the statute is not meaningless, and 
as we view it, it was the intent ·of the legislature in sueh 
cases, a.s the case at bar, tha!t not .only sh'ould the ,Q!om-
mission apply the statute, but the injured employee, as 
a matter of right, is entitled to have th~ statute applie-d 
on her behalf. 
We do not believe the ·Commission er·red in ap·plying 
tills Section of the statute, in granting double compensa-
tion in this case. 
-For the reasons herein stated, we respectfully sub-
mit-that the findings .and order of the .Commission in this 
case should be sustained and judgment by this court 
should be s-o entered. 
Respe-ctfully submitted, 
A. H. HouGAARD, 
E. LEROY 'SHIELDS, 
LEGRANDE L. BELNAP, 
GROVER A. GILES, Attorney General 
for the 1State of Utah, . 
. Attorn.eys for. Defendd!nts. 
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